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The psy disciplines (i.e., psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy) 
have played a significant role in shaping understandings of transgender people’s lives 
in ways that are transnormative (i.e., by emphasizing one particular account of what it 
means to be transgender). This paper documents 1) how the rise of the psy disciplines 
created opportunities for transgender people to access treatment (but that such access 
often required tacit acceptance of transnormativity), and 2) how transgender people 
have resisted transnormative accounts within the psy disciplines. More specifically, 
this paper explores how both the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual, and what is now the World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health’s Standards of Care, have often enshrined highly regulatory 
accounts of transgender people’s lives, while also changing over time, in part due to 
the contributions of transgender people. The paper concludes by considering recent 
contributions by transgender people in terms of the use of informed consent models of 
care and clinical research, and highlights the ongoing marginalization of transgender 
people in terms of access to ethical, trans-competent care.  
 
Keywords: clinical care, history, pathologization, psy disciplines, transgender, 
transnormativity 
Public Significance Statement 
This paper examines some of the histories of interactions between the mental health 
professions and transgender people. It argues that these interactions are shaped by 
norms regarding what it means to be transgender. The paper examines such norms in 
relation to two different mental health diagnostic and treatment documents, finding 
that they promote norms as much as they potentially facilitate access to services.  
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Transnormativity in the psy disciplines: Constructing pathology in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual and Standards of Care 
 
In this paper we explore how what Rose (1998) termed the “psy disciplines” (i.e., 
psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy) have created and 
perpetuated forms of normativity with regard to the clinical care of transgender1 
people. In order to do so we present a reading of both the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care. In so doing, we 
argue that the psy disciplines have sought to enforce a particular version of life for 
transgender people that may be characterized as “transnormative” (Latham, 2019; 
Vipond, 2015). By transnormative, we refer to the ways in which dominant narratives 
about what it means to be transgender emphasize a particular and narrow set of tropes 
to which all transgender people are expected to adhere. These include expectations 
that 1) all transgender people conform to a “wrong body narrative”2 when describing 
their gender (Latham, 2019), 2) all transgender people require medical treatment, and 
3) all transgender people should seek to present and be perceived as cisgender. As 
such, while transnormative narratives may be used to justify medical interventions 
such as hormone therapy and surgeries when these are requested by transgender 
                                                        
1 We note that “transgender” is a contemporary term that was popularized in its current form from the 1990s 
onwards (Stryker, 2008). We recognize that our use of the term may therefore be somewhat anachronistic; 
however, we use it in this paper to emphasize continuities in experience, practice and the construction of 
transnormativity over time. Where relevant, we also use clinical terms such as “sexual invert” and “transsexual” to 
acknowledge how certain individuals we might now recognize as transgender were described within the psy 
disciplines in the past. 
2The “wrong body” narrative frames transgender experience as being “born in the wrong body.” This concept is 
implicitly present in diagnoses such as Transsexualism (ICD-10) and Gender Dysphoria (DSM-5), and explicitly 
referred to in the DSM-IV-TR diagnosis Gender Identity Disorder (Engdahl, 2014). For critiques, see Bettcher 
(2014) and Lester (2017). 
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people, they can also underpin “reparative” approaches which place in question a 
person’s gender.  
In terms of the psy disciplines, then, and as Austin (2016) notes, healthcare 
“should be understood as [a conduit] of transnormativity, a regulatory normative 
ideology that structures interactions in every arena of social life” (p. 466). The power 
of the psy disciplines in terms of contributing to normative and indeed pathologizing 
accounts of transgender people is also evident in broader cultural narratives. 
Examples of this are legion, including: accounts that position the growing number of 
children disclosing that they are transgender as a form of “social contagion” (Ashley, 
2019); and the denial of transgender people’s existence altogether (Kennedy, 2020). 
These cultural narratives often draw heavily on the psy disciplines in their 
pathologization of transgender people’s lives. Such cultural narratives serve to justify 
a transnormative account, drawing as they do on authoritative psy disciplinary 
accounts of what are constructed as transgender people’s supposed best interests.  
Importantly, however, in this paper we seek not simply to suggest that 
pathologization and transnormativity, as oppressive regimes of power, control 
transgender people’s lives absolutely. Rather, we situate historical accounts of clinical 
care and the development of clinical guidelines alongside the actions of transgender 
people to demonstrate the traffic between clinicians, guidelines, and transgender 
communities. This adds complexity to a history that can too easily appear monolithic. 
Indeed, some transgender people have taken up normative accounts of their lives and, 
in turn, such accounts have been adopted and standardized in the realm of clinical 
care. In other contexts, transgender people have resisted normative accounts, calling 
for radical revisions to what constitutes ethical and competent clinical care. In some 
contexts, such calls have been successful; in others, the dominance of transnormative 
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(and moreover pathologizing) accounts within the psy disciplines have had (and 
continue to have) a significant and negative impact on transgender people’s lives. It is 
these points of tension, intersection, and divergence that this paper highlights. 
 
Competing Pathways to the Recognition and Pathologization of Trans People  
In order to situate the development of transnormativity within the psy 
disciplines, it is important to explore the historical roots of transnormativity. With the 
emergence of the psy disciplines in the 19th century, increased scientific attention was 
paid to the lives of gender-diverse people in North American and European societies. 
Writers such as Austro-German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing and English 
sexologist Havelock Ellis sought to define and delineate what was seen as “sexual 
deviance.” Behaviors that transgressed social sex roles (such as cross-dressing) were 
positioned as pathological, as were intersex bodies and various forms of sexual desire 
(including homosexuality) (Stryker, 2008). The “wrong body” narrative, now so 
typically associated with transgender histories, certainly played a role in the early 
pathologization of people we might now describe as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or 
transgender (who at the time were often described as “sexual inverts”). For example, 
Krafft-Ebing (1927, p. 399) described “female inverts” (that is, individuals assigned 
female as birth who were perceived as possessing male behavioral traits) as 
possessing “[t]he masculine soul, heaving in the female bosom [sic].” However, as we 
will show, transnormativity evolved over time. Early treatment pathways were 
arguably influenced as much by eugenicist logics and experimental attempts to 
reverse human aging as they were by the notion that a person’s physical sex might be 
remade to reflect their gender or sexual soul (Amin, 2018).  
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In associating particular forms of behavior, desire, and embodiment with 
illness or degeneracy, early sexologists simultaneously worked to construct, reinforce, 
and question sexual and gender norms (Gill-Peterson, 2018a; Stryker, 2008). 
Researchers have described how constructions of binary sex and gender, and 
“normal” and “abnormal” womanhood, evolved alongside the pathologization of 
gender-diverse people, through the emergence of diagnoses such as hysteria, 
borderline personality disorder, and masochism in the psy disciplines (Hyde, Bigler, 
Joel, Tate, & van Anders, 2019; Tosh, 2016). Chesler (2005) and Tosh (2016) have 
argued that such diagnoses worked to pathologize both femininity and sexual 
nonconformity, with women positioned as “mentally ill” if their behavior conformed 
too closely to feminine stereotypes or strayed too far from them. However, sexology 
also worked to create visibility for sexual diversity and inspired those who sought 
recognition: for example, self-ascribed “invert” Radclyffe Hall prominently referred 
to Ellis’ work in her 1928 novel, The Well of Loneliness (Pearce, 2018). 
The pathologization of supposed sexual deviance also relied on logics of 
racialization (Amin, 2018; Gill-Peterson, 2018b; Snorton, 2017). For example, 
Honkasalo (2020, p. 20) notes that the supposed effeminacy of Jewish men was 
“thought to be an external sign of pathology” by anti-Semitic scientists. Similarly, 
Havelock Ellis positioned Black women’s physiology as inferior to that of white 
women in his 1900 book Studies of the Psychology of Sex Vol. 2., and described “the 
question of sex–with the racial question that rests on it” as “a chief problem for 
solution” in the introduction to Sexual Inversion (Ellis & Symonds, 1897, cited in 
Snorton, 2017, p. 4). Like many white Western thinkers in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, including feminists, socialists, and liberals, as well as conservatives and 
fascists, Ellis believed in eugenics: the principle of improving humanity through 
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selective breeding. While Ellis was broadly sympathetic to “inverts,” eugenic 
“science” provided an ideological rationale for modifying bodies in order to contain 
supposed sexual and racial deviancy, and therefore preserve the health of the “white 
race.” Consequently, many “hysterical” and working-class women, disabled people, 
and people of color were targeted for sterilization in North America and many 
European societies (Honkasalo, 2020).  
It was in this context that German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld “appealed to 
eugenic science to legitimise genitoplasties under the Weimar Republic’s Criminal 
Code §175, which criminalised deviant forms of sexuality” (Honkasalo, 2020, p. 23). 
For early patients such as Lili Elbe (1882-1931, treated by Kurt Warnekros, a 
contemporary of Hirschfeld), surgeries offered an opportunity to elude narratives of 
degeneracy through “glandular rejuvenation.” With the implantation of donated 
ovaries, Elbe (for example) might hope to make the transition from sickly middle-
aged “male invert” to “an exemplar of youthful, vigorous, feminine European 
womanhood” (Amin, 2018, p. 598). In this way, her gender transition represented an 
attempt to fulfill eugenic ideals, through age reversal and improving the health of 
(white) humanity, at least as much as it represented a physical shift from “male” to 
“female.” As Amin (2018) observes, this rationale differed substantially from the 
discourses that were to later underpin normative narratives of “transsexual” desire and 
embodiment, even as the history of these procedures remains entwined.  
Hirschfeld’s Institut für Sexualwissenschaft closed in 1933 following a Nazi 
raid and the burning of its extensive library (Stryker, 2008); Warnekros went on to 
collaborate with the Nazis, performing involuntary sterilizations (Amin, 2018). In 
North America, many clinicians initially felt uncomfortable providing the kind of 
treatments offered through centers such as Hirschfeld’s Institut, citing both legal and 
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ethical constraints (Meyerowitz, 2002). For example, in 1949 David O. Cauldwell 
wrote of “Earl,” a male-identified patient who requested access to testosterone and 
chest and genital surgeries. Cauldwell describes Earl’s desires as “impossible,” 
arguing: “It would be criminal for any surgeon to mutilate a pair of healthy breasts 
and it would be just as criminal for a surgeon to castrate a woman [sic] with no 
disease of the ovaries and related glands” (2006, p. 52). With medical transition ruled 
out, many practitioners assumed the desire to transition was a matter of 
psychopathology. They consequently recommended reparative psychiatric or 
psychotherapeutic interventions to “cure” individuals of this desire, which proved to 
be ineffective (Rubin, 2006).   
At the same time that individuals such as Earl were being denied access to 
desired treatment, other people – including individuals we might today recognize as 
intersex people, gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people – were being subjected to 
unnecessary medical interventions. For psychiatrists such as Clifford Allen, who 
worked with intersex patients alongside endocrinologist Lennox Ross Boster in the 
1930s and 1940s at Charing Cross Hospital in London, UK (later the location of the 
UK’s largest Gender Identity Clinic), “biological normality was structured into a 
binary of male and female bodies, and linked to a strict psychological normality, as 
measured by heterosexuality” (Griffiths, 2018, p. 479). In practice, this meant that 
patients were subjected to hormonal and surgical procedures to “normalize” their 
bodies. Initially, practitioners such as Allen and Boster worked primarily with adults, 
many of whom were involved in consultative processes and potentially consented to 
treatment. Over time, however, practitioners such as UK urologist David Innes 
Williams and American psychologist John Money facilitated surgical interventions on 
infants to conform their bodies to binary sex norms (Griffiths, 2018). Concurrently, 
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from the 1930s through to the 1950s, endocrinologists and psy professionals 
attempted to “cure” “inverts” through the involuntary administration of hormonal 
treatments (Rubin, 2006).  
In these early years, the limited access to affirmative, consensual medical 
transition for non-intersex people was driven largely by patient demand (Meyerowitz, 
2002). Through press reports on “sex change” operations, prospective patients “found 
a language in which to express their feelings of having been raised as the wrong sex” 
(Griffiths, 2018, p. 481). For example, Cauldwell (2006) reports receiving numerous 
letters from people seeking to transition, and Gill-Peterson (2018b, p. 609) describes 
how many prospective patients “strategically adopted intersex rhetoric to describe 
themselves, hoping that would legitimate their request.” German-American sexologist 
and endocrinologist Harry Benjamin, a former colleague of Hirschfeld, was 
influential in arguing that these desires be taken seriously.3 Importantly, while 
Benjamin acknowledged that psy professionals could offer constructive guidance and 
support for those he described as transsexuals, he observed that this approach did not 
offer an actual cure for the desire to transition. By contrast, surgeries and hormone 
treatments could provide measurable relief. However, Benjamin insisted that an 
important role remained for psychiatric assessment: “The psychiatrist must have the 
last word [on the matter of physical interventions]. He [sic] has to evaluate the 
personality in regard to possible future consequences and also as to the likelihood of 
somehow making life bearable under the status quo” (Benjamin, 1954, p. 229).  
 
 
                                                        
3 Notably, Benjamin was originally better-known for his work on glandular rejuvenation than his 
writings on transsexualism (Amin, 2018). It was his demonstrable success in the latter field that sealed 
his legacy. 
TRANSNORMATIVITY IN THE PSY DISCIPLINES 
 
10 
Institutionalization of the Psy Disciplines and the Invention of Transnormativity 
From the mid-20th century, the evolution of specialist clinical practice for 
transgender people sat alongside autobiographical accounts of transgender people’s 
lives in which the authors were more or less compelled to take up what quickly 
became transnormative narratives. An example of this can be seen in the psy 
disciplines’ injunction for transgender people to present a desexualized image of their 
subjectivity. The life of Christine Jorgensen, a transgender woman whose story was 
reported widely in the North American press from 1952 onward, provides a clear 
example of the intersections between the experiences of transgender people and the 
use of their experiences by the psy disciplines to authorize particular transnormative 
responses. Jorgensen felt it necessary to present herself as non-sexual in early self-
representations, so as to combat the conflation of (homo)sexuality and gender in early 
sexological accounts (Meyerowitz, 2002; Serlin, 2004). This type of non-sexual 
imagery was then (re)incorporated into transnormative representations of transgender 
women within the psy disciplines, to the extent that clinical teams were reticent to 
accept women who presented narratives involving interest in active sexual futures, 
and most certainly functioned to exclude women who reported non-heterosexual 
orientations (Meyerowitz, 2002).  
As Rose (1998) notes, the institutionalization of the psy disciplines involved a 
process whereby individuals were drawn into a network of power relations in which 
they were encouraged to self-monitor according to standards rapidly established by 
the psy disciplines themselves. This can be seen clearly in the examples of Elbe and 
Jorgensen, and as Pyne (2014) notes specifically with regard to transgender children, 
may be framed as a form of recognition – with transgender being seen as a 
“phenomenon” worthy of engagement. Yet such recognition typically comes at a cost. 
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With recognition comes self-regulation and the social demand to hold oneself 
accountable to existing norms, be these the eugenic logics of the early 20th century, 
the particular forms of sexism, racism, and homophobia that prevailed in the 1950s, 
and those that prevail today. “Recognition” by the psy disciplines for transgender 
people from the mid 20th century was, then, not necessarily recognition of the 
diversity of transgender people’s lives, but rather recognition of a culturally mediated, 
psy-inflected account of what it meant to be transgender. It is at this period of time, 
we suggest, that contemporary transnormative accounts began to cohere and publicly 
circulate.  
The proliferation of transnormative accounts is further evident in narratives 
made public by Jorgensen, her European clinical team, and the interpretations of these 
accounts in the press in the early 1950s. Specifically, it has been suggested that 
Jorgensen enacted self-determination according to a very specific set of rules about 
what it meant to be a (white) woman (Meyerowitz, 2002; Serlin, 2004; Snorton, 
2017). Jorgensen’s appearance and personality were a frequent topic of commentary 
at the time, emphasizing her normative femininity in a context wherein this was 
paramount for women. Importantly, this is not to suggest that Jorgensen was a dupe of 
her time. Rather, it is to highlight that staking a claim to freedom (in Jorgensen’s case, 
to live as her gender in postwar America) both enacted the American dream of 
“choice,” and did so within the constraints of the racialized, heteromasculinist logics 
considered socially acceptable during this time (Serlin, 2004). More broadly, the 
reporting of Jorgensen’s life set the stage for a transnormative narrative that was taken 
up within the psy disciplines, as we shall see in the following sections. This is an 
important point to reiterate in the context of this paper: As much as Jorgensen’s 
expression of her gender was structured by dominant discourses of the time, which 
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were in many ways shaped by the psy disciplines and individual clinicians’ responses 
to and accounts of her life, Jorgensen (and other women whose narratives later 
became public) very much shaped how the psy disciplines came to understand and 
engage with transgender people more broadly.  
 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)  
In this section we consider how clinical and professional debates have led to 
highly-consequential understandings and prescriptions for engaging with gender and 
sexually-diverse people (for more on this see Hegarty, 2018). While our primary 
focus is on detailing the psy disciplines’ engagement with gender diversity, in order to 
do so we must also understand the entangled history of the psy disciplines’ 
engagement with sexual diversity. We suggest that the struggle to define and control 
some of the most marginal members of society is always also a struggle for 
dominance and authority among its most privileged. This is perhaps most readily 
evident in the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).  
First published in 1952, the DSM is now in its fifth edition, though it has 
undergone numerous revisions and printings across its nearly seven-decade life. The 
DSM is intended to name and describe various mental disorders, serving as the key 
clinical diagnostic tool for the psy-disciplines. The first edition of the DSM was 132 
pages, outlining 128 distinct diagnoses. The current edition is 947 pages with 541 
diagnoses (Blashfield, Kelley, Flanagan, & Miles, 2014). Diagnosing mental 
disorders is a profitable enterprise, with revenue from the DSM in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars. As a result, those involved in writing various editions of the DSM 
have faced their share of controversy (Blashfield, Kelley, Flanagan, & Miles, 2014). 
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Non-normative gender and sexuality have been a focus across all editions in the 
nearly 70-year history of the DSM (for a comprehensive overview, see Drescher, 
2010).  
“Transvestism” was listed in only the DSM-I and DSM-II. “Gender Identity 
Disorders” were first listed with two main types – Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood (GIDC) and Transsexualism – in the DSM III (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980). In the DSM-III-R, a third type was added – Gender Identity 
Disorder of Adolescence and Adulthood, Nontranssexual Type (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987). In the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the 
diagnostic name changed to “Gender Identity Disorder” (GID). In the DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), the GID diagnosis required that the 
individual experience distress or impaired functioning. In the DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013), the diagnosis of “Gender Identity Disorder” was 
removed and replaced with the diagnosis of “Gender Dysphoria,” the logic being to 
shift the focus away from seeing gender diversity as a disorder, and to instead focus 
on the distress arising from the experience of dysphoria.  
Diagnosis within the DSM has always held potential promise and peril for 
transgender communities, and queer people more broadly. Characterization of queer 
people within the DSM across time has varied from disordered to deviant, fetishistic, 
developmentally-arrested, immature, socially maladjusted, dysfunctional, and 
distressed (Bryant, 2006; Drescher, 2010, 2015; Hegarty, 2018). For some 
transgender people in the 21st century, official diagnoses of “Gender Identity 
Disorder” or “Gender Dysphoria” could provide a productive gateway to accessing 
hormones and surgeries that may even be fully or partially covered by medical 
insurance (Davy, 2015). Given the high stakes of diagnosis – which range from social 
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stigma to redemption, with associated treatments and policy recommendations 
spanning from punitive to liberative – it is imperative to consider just who is given the 
power of diagnosis.  
Because the DSM is an official publication of the APA, psychiatrists have 
been at the forefront of determining diagnostic categories for mental disorders. For 
the past century, medicine has been a generally high-status and esteemed profession, 
yet prestige hierarchies exist internally, with psychiatry typically located near the 
bottom of such rankings (Norredam & Album, 2007). Since the 1970s, the percentage 
of men relative to women has been shrinking, with men constituting more than 87% 
of all psychiatrists in 1973 and only 45% of all psychiatric residents by 2013 (Scher, 
1973; Willis, 2013). Historically, however, most diagnostic decision-making around 
gender and sexually non-conforming people has been made by white, cisgender, 
heterosexual men within the field of psychiatry (see Ansara & Hegarty, 2012 on the 
“invisible college” informing these diagnoses).  
Importantly, these decisions and struggles have not been made without 
pushback.  
In the same period of time as the DSM-I and DSM-II were being written and 
published, social activists and movements grew louder and more insistent in their 
demands for social justice. The 1966 Compton’s Cafeteria uprising in the Tenderloin 
district of San Francisco and the 1969 Stonewall Inn rebellion in New York City 
demonstrated the irrepressibility of queer people’s rage and frustration over state and 
institutional violence and oppression, particularly among its most likely targets – 
poor, trans, women of color (Stryker, 2008). Contributing precursors to the removal 
of homosexuality from the DSM III include disruptions of the annual meeting of the 
American Medical Association (AMA) and APA by queer people engaging in protest 
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as members of the public and sometimes as members from within these organizations 
(e.g. John Fryer aka “Dr. Henry Anonymous,” who appeared disguised at the 1972 
APA meeting) (Cotten & Ridings, 2011; Pillard, 2009). During this same time, Black 
and Latinx transgender rights activists, such as Marsha P. Johnson and Sylvia Rivera, 
focused on the rights of some of the most disaffected members of queer communities 
– such as poor, homeless, queer, and trans people of color – through formation of 
groups such as Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (Stryker, 2008). These 
social activist engagements, however, were likely more distant from psy community 
awareness due to the racial, class, and cisgender privilege of their leading authorities. 
Despite the success of advocates in terms of the removal of homosexuality 
from the DSM III, it has been argued that this then opened the door for the 
introduction of other diagnostic categories that produced similar regulatory effects. 
Karl Bryant (2006; 2008), for example, offers a compelling account of the emergence 
of diagnostic categories around non-normative genders, particularly among children 
positioned as effeminate boys. Bryant argues that the emergence of GIDC in the 
DSM-III, for example, provides evidence for how diagnoses are not only 
manufactured to provide rationalization for existing clinical practices, but also may be 
deployed to recuperate marginalized social subjects who have attained broader 
sociocultural acceptance while targeting others for greater regulation and intervention 
(2006, 2008). In this way, shifting diagnostic categories hold both generative and 
repressive potentials for already-marginalized groups. As homosexuality gained 
greater social acceptance, clinical classifications focusing on these groups needed to 
shift as well. Bryant (2006; 2008) details how the diagnosis of GIDC, authored 
primarily by Richard Green (1987), produced two distinct normative outcomes 
targeting (primarily) effeminate boys (who were seen as either pre-homosexual or 
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pre-transsexual) for diagnosis and treatment: 1) producing socially-acceptable, 
masculine, gay men and 2) limiting the potential for future adult trans womanhood. 
Indeed, some clinicians who utilized now-defunct diagnoses for gay and lesbian 
people then refocused their diagnoses and therapeutic interventions (some of which 
have been described as “gender-reparative therapies”) on transgender and gender non-
conforming patients (Lev, 2013, p. 293). 
Despite this renewed focus within the psy disciplines on the pathologization of 
diversity, at the same time the AIDS crisis of the 1980s disproportionately impacted 
gender-nonconforming gay men and transgender women, further igniting activism 
and galvanizing queer people to, quite literally, fight for their lives (Epstein, 1996; 
Hegarty, 2018). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, students and researchers also 
challenged medical authority and its relationship to social justice and equity (Metzl & 
Kirkland, 2010). From the 1990s a growing proportion of transgender people told 
their own stories through published autobiographies, describing and sometimes 
resisting clinical gatekeeping practices and transnormative expectations (Pfeffer, 
2017). However, these narratives, as well as social-science scholarship published by 
feminist and transgender scholars, were largely ignored by those crafting the DSM 
(Davy, 2015). Nonetheless, transgender rights initiatives and organizations such as 
GID Reform Advocates, Stop Transgender Pathologization, and Global Action for 
Trans* Equality have been vocal in their resistance to the medicalization of 
transgender people’s experience (Cabral, Suess, Ehrt, Seehole, & Wong, 2016; Davy, 
2015). 
 Part of such resistance to medicalization has been a robust critique of the 
empirical literature on gender diversity: a literature largely written by white, 
cisgender, heterosexual men, which has targeted gender non-conforming behaviors, 
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especially among children, who are often characterized as more clinically malleable 
(see overviews by Bryant, 2006, 2008 and Hegarty, 2018). Such critiques emphasize 
that even in instances where diagnosticians attempted to resist a pathologizing focus 
on gender non-conforming people, they tended to focus upon subjective feelings of 
isolation and social dejection to make diagnostic classifications. Doing so has the 
effect of displacing responsibility for responding to social injustice: diagnosing a 
targeted individual as disordered or ill rather than seeking to change the cisgenderist 
and heterosexist society or social system in which they are embedded.  
Yet despite the insights produced by such critiques, they have largely gone 
unheeded by those central to framing debates within the psy disciplines (Cotten & 
Ridings, 2011; Davy, 2015; Reicherzer, 2008). Scholarship and clinical practice are 
rarely solely about one’s profession or patients. They are also about being perceived 
as correct and being seen publicly and among one’s peers as right or even righteous, 
sometimes even sparring and reconciling with one another (or with one’s self; see 
Spitzer, 2012) publicly and protractedly through the pages of paywalled, peer 
reviewed, major, academic journals (e.g., Bayer & Spitzer, 1982). In this way, the 
story of transgender people’s classification across various iterations of the DSM is 
also the less-examined story of “credibility struggles” (Epstein 1996; Pearce, 2018) 
and “masculinity crises” (Serlin, 2004) among the disproportionately white, cisgender 
men working to establish personal and professional authority across shifting social 
contexts. How this story might change, as the field of power relations that constitutes 
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From The Transsexual Phenomenon to the Standards of Care 
The second key text which has historically governed transgender people’s 
relationship with the psy disciplines is the Standards of Care (SOC), first published in 
1979. The SOC are written by a committee assembled by the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), an ostensibly international 
organization based primarily in the United States (U.S.). Whereas the DSM is used to 
diagnose, the WPATH SOC is intended to provide authoritative guidance on how to 
manage a medical gender transition. Early versions of the SOC echoed Harry 
Benjamin’s (1966) influential work, The Transsexual Phenomenon, in centering the 
role of mental health diagnoses and assuming a transition from a “male” sexed 
embodiment and associated gender role to a “female” sexed embodiment and gender 
role, or vice-versa, with those who transitioned described as “transsexuals” (Berger et 
al., 1979). In this way, the SOC contributed to the construction of a transnormative 
narrative that centers particular binary conceptualizations of sexed and gendered 
possibilities, even as it also helped to open up new pathways for medical transition.  
When the SOC were first written, surgical and endocrinological interventions 
designed to facilitate gender transition had already existed within Western medicine 
for several decades, as a consequence of 1) earlier rejuvenation experiments, 2) 
affirmative care for transgender people facilitated by pioneers such as Hirschfeld, 3) 
hormonal interventions for “inverts,” and 4) operations on intersex people, as we have 
outlined earlier in this paper. However, a clinical consensus on treatment pathways 
for “transsexuality” was only just emerging (Gill-Peterson, 2018a; Meyerowitz, 
2002). Meyerowitz describes how “in the 1960s, most roads led to Benjamin” (p. 133) 
for individuals seeking to medically transition in the U.S.; psy professionals and 
medical doctors alike increasingly referred patients to Benjamin, as did women such 
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as Christine Jorgensen and Tamara Rees. In turn, Benjamin worked with other 
professionals to ensure that his patients underwent mental health assessments as part 
of the diagnostic process and in order to receive access to services.  
In 1966, the year of the Compton’s Cafeteria rebellion, Benjamin published 
The Transsexual Phenomenon. This book codified and popularized a medical pathway 
for gender transition, drawing on clinical experience and evidence of patient 
satisfaction from research undertaken with Benjamin’s clients. There are some 
interesting parallels and connections between these two very different events, as well 
as obvious points of departure. Compton’s represented an uprising against police 
raids, led predominantly by transgender sex workers and drag queens. The 
Transsexual Phenomenon represented an intervention from an authority figure who, 
in contrast to the San Francisco police, sought to make (certain, normative forms of) 
transgender life more livable (Pearce, 2018). Stryker (2008, p. 74) notes that “some of 
[Benjamin’s] patients were the very Tenderloin street queens who would soon start 
fighting back […] the changes in medical-service provision that Benjamin 
recommended must have been an electrifying call to action.” In the wake of 
Compton’s (and later, Stonewall), former protesters worked with minimal funding to 
successfully campaign for decriminalization and new healthcare services, creating 
groups and networks for political advocacy and mutual support such as Conversion 
Our Goal and Vanguard (Meyerowitz, 2002; Stryker, 2008). 
Notably, much of the research Benjamin (1966) drew upon was funded by the 
Erickson Educational Foundation (EEF), a charitable body founded by a transgender 
man –Reed Erickson (Meyerowitz, 2002). The aim of the EEF was to finance research 
on transsexualism and associated clinical interventions. Like the protesters at 
Compton, Erickson utilized the resources available to him to bring about change; 
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however, in contrast to the poor and predominantly transfeminine protesters, he was a 
white man from a wealthy family. In spending millions of dollars through the EEF 
funding healthcare, research, and education projects from the 1960s through to the 
1980s, Erickson played a key role in shaping the contemporary landscape of 
transgender health and ensuring the availability of services for thousands of people 
(Devor & Matte, 2007; Gill-Peterson 2018a). However, in contrast to the focus on 
self-determination in the work of Compton’s and Stonewall veterans, Erickson’s 
interventions also effectively worked to support the institutional power and privilege 
of cisgender researchers and, consequently, the transnormative regulation of 
transgender patients. Having funded his own transition in the early 1960s, he did not 
have to contend with medical gatekeeping and the economic insecurity experienced 
by many people seeking to access services; on the contrary, practitioners sought his 
support. Hence, while Erickson’s contributions and generosity are undeniable, his 
racial, economic, and gender privilege ensured that he was distanced from many of 
the challenges faced by the prospective transsexual patients he sought to help.  
In the late 1960s, a new generation of healthcare professionals began to 
facilitate medical transitions, with many inspired by Benjamin and/or directly funded 
by the EEF (Gill-Peterson, 2018a). In addition to the publication of Benjamin’s key 
work, 1966 saw the opening of the first Gender Identity Clinics (GICs) in the U.S., at 
Johns Hopkins Hospital and the University of Minnesota Medical School 
(Meyerowitz, 2002). These were specialist multidisciplinary centers which offered 
mental health assessment and – for a lucky few – hormone therapy and surgeries for 
patients who presented as transsexual. In 1969, the year of the Stonewall rebellion, 
the EEF funded the first International Symposium on Gender Identity in London, 
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England, as well as the anthology, Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment, edited by 
Richard Green and John Money (Meyerowitz, 2002). 
By 1978, approximately 40 specialist clinics offering “surgical sex-
reassignment to persons having a multiplicity of behavioral diagnoses” could be 
found across the Western hemisphere (Berger et al., 1979, p. 1). Building on the work 
of figures such as Benjamin, Green, and Money, these institutions devised criteria by 
which psy professionals might assess patients and manage access to hormone therapy 
and surgery. This enabled them to justify their work when faced with criticism from 
those who, like Cauldwell (2006), argued that such interventions represented an 
unnecessary “mutilation” of otherwise “healthy” bodies. However, it had the 
consequence of creating a gatekeeping system in which patients were expected to 
conform to transnormative narratives. Similarly, access to the GICs was limited by 
factors such as race, class, and age (Gill-Peterson, 2018a). To obtain the treatment 
they sought, patients needed to first articulate their experiences in a manner that 
would be taken seriously by the predominantly middle-class, white, cisgender, male 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists who oversaw these institutions. Consequently, 
while the first patient to undergo gender-affirming surgery at Johns Hopkins was 
Avon Wilson, a Black woman (Meyerowitz, 2002), transgender people who 
experienced intersecting forms of marginalization were less likely to be seen as 
“conventional” women or men. In this way, the emerging clinical consensus worked 
both to enable new forms of transgender subjectivity through medical transition and 
to restrict the scope of sexed and gendered possibility (Pearce, 2018). 
International Symposia on Gender Identity continued to be organized 
throughout the 1970s. In 1975, attendees of the Fourth International Symposium 
appointed committees to draft overarching guidance for practitioners working with 
TRANSNORMATIVITY IN THE PSY DISCIPLINES 
 
22 
transsexuals (Meyerowitz, 2002). This was eventually published as what would later 
be recognized as Version 1 of the SOC (Berger et al., 1979), by a new organization 
known as the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association 
(HBIGDA), named to honor Benjamin’s work in shaping the field (Benjamin himself 
was not directly involved in the organization). The second, third, and fourth versions 
of the SOC made very few revisions to the original text (Berger et al., 1980, 1981, 
1990). All four documents represented a consolidation both of Benjamin’s ideas and 
of the central role of the psy disciplines, now positioned as key gatekeepers for 
treatment. Evaluation was originally to be undertaken by any licensed psychiatrist or 
psychologist (Berger et al., 1979), but from 1981 the SOC specified that “[p]ersons 
recommending sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy should have the 
documented training and experience to diagnose a broad range of sexual conditions” 
and “proven competence in general psychotherapy, sex therapy, and gender 
counseling/therapy” (Berger et al., 1981, p. 3). The role of these practitioners was to 
“study and evaluate” patients who expressed a desire for medical transition and assess 
their readiness for treatment through an evaluation of “reasons, motives, attitudes, 
purposes, etc.” (Berger et al., 1979, p. 3). This was to be done in accordance with the 
Transsexualism and Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood diagnoses in DSM-III; 
not coincidentally, these diagnoses were authored largely by Richard Green (Bryant, 
2006; Meyerowitz, 2002), who also co-authored SOC Versions 1-4 and was a 
consultant on Version 5 (Levine et al., 1995).  
The Transsexualism diagnosis required that patients exhibit a persistent desire 
for medical transition over a period of at least two years; the SOC recommended that 
evidence of this was to be obtained through a long-term therapeutic relationship 
between patient and professional, and/or through interview(s) with a friend or relative 
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of the patient. The authority and judgment of the psy-disciplines professional was 
paramount, with the SOC requiring that “the clinical behavioral scientist have 
knowledge, independent of the patient’s verbal claim … [of] dysphoria, discomfort, 
sense of inappropriateness and wish to be rid of one’s own genitals” (Berger et al., 
1981, p. 7, emphasis added). Patients were required to live full-time in “the social role 
of the genetically other sex” for at least 12 months prior to the provision of any 
genital surgery, in a process that was later to be formally known as “Real Life 
Experience” (Levine et al., 1998). Medical transition was assumed to be a linear 
process, with desire for surgery being assumed in the assessment for hormone 
therapy, and a good response to hormone therapy being a prerequisite for surgery. 
Patients learned to self-surveil, through presenting certain transnormative 
narratives and expressing particular kinds of desire. Meyerowitz (2002), Stone (1991), 
and Latham (2019) have described how a discursive feedback loop emerged, in which 
psy-discipline professionals assumed that particular behaviors (such as the stated 
desire to be rid of one’s genitals) were indicative of transsexualism, so patients 
described and performed these behaviors, leading the professionals to assume that 
their original presuppositions were correct. Another consequence was that many GICs 
continued to encourage patients to adhere to normative gender roles and stereotypes, 
thereby effectively policing both transsexual identity and limiting the scope of 
imagined possibility. Stone (1991, p. 291) argues that this constituted a fully 
acculturated, consensual definition of gender and “at the site of their enactment we 
can locate an actual instance of the apparatus of production of gender.” For example, 
in an echo of the eugenic histories of transgender medicine, Norwegian health 
authorities were advised by the gender identity team to require irreversible 
sterilization as a condition for gender recognition in the late 1980s. Their explicit 
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intention was “to avoid the potential calamity of a menstruating man, or even worse, a 
pregnant man, which would bring the hospital into disgrace” (Monro & Van Der Ros, 
2018, p. 66).  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the authors of the early editions of the SOC took 
their work very seriously indeed. They refer explicitly to “the moral responsibility” of 
making a decision to recommend hormones and/or surgery (or not) (Berger et al., 
1979, p. 5), a sentiment explicitly echoed in Versions 5 and 6 of the SOC (Levine et 
al., 1998; Meyer et al., 2005), as well as more recent publications by contemporary 
gender specialists, some of whom are themselves transgender (e.g. Richards et al., 
2014). This somewhat paternalistic approach ultimately diminishes recognition of 
decision-making processes undertaken by patients themselves (Davy, 2015; Gill-
Peterson, 2018a, Pearce, 2018).  
Transgender people’s voices were almost entirely absent from the SOC until 
Version 7 was first published in 2011. The first four versions were based on a 
document written by six cisgender American men; a proposal to include a transsexual 
person on this committee was voted down by the (predominantly cisgender) attendees 
of the Fifth International Symposium on Gender Identity in 1977 (Meyerowitz, 2002, 
p. 254). Dallas Denny and Jan Roberts (1995, p. 9) describe how “[i]n the early 
1980s, Jude Patton, a transsexual man, was the ‘consumer’ representative on the 
HBIGDA Board of Directors,” but by the 1990s there were no known transgender 
people on either the HBIGDA Board or the new committee that had been drawn up to 
revise the SOC. Denny, an openly transgender woman, was later listed as a 
“consultant” for Version 5 of the SOC, alongside transgender man Jamison Green and 
transsexual Anne Lawrence (Levine et al., 1998). For a supposedly “international” 
organization, the HBIGDA was also deeply US-centric. Only three out of the seven 
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authors of the Version 5 SOC were based outside of the U.S. (in Canada, Germany, 
and the Netherlands); while more international authors were involved in Versions 6 
and 7, these documents still predominantly represent a U.S. perspective.  
Having noted the absence of transgender voices within the HBIGDA, Denny 
and Roberts (1995) conducted a survey of transgender people in the U.S. to explore 
their views on the SOC. They found a majority of their 399 respondents supported the 
existence of the SOC, but also sought a more flexible treatment pathway. Almost 80% 
of respondents had heard of the SOC, and while many of these individuals had heard 
about the SOC from professional sources, others found themselves educating 
professionals about the existence of the guidance document. These findings reflect an 
ambivalence towards clinical pathways that can be traced back to the 1960s and 
remains within transgender communities to this day.  
The most recent edition of the SOC (Version 7, originally published in 2011) 
has begun to acknowledge the growing diversity of transgender language and the 
possibility of non-binary genders, in which the patient’s desired sexed embodiment 
and gender may differ, and indeed depart from presumed “female” or “male” norms 
(Coleman et al., 2012). The HBIGDA has also undergone changes; in 2006 it became 
the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH). In 2007, a 
British activist and legal scholar, Stephen Whittle, was the first transgender person 
(and first non-medic) to become President of the organization. Whittle’s election 
represented the culmination of a campaign by transgender professionals to play an 
active role in HBIGDA/WPATH; he was also one of several transgender people 
credited with co-authorship of the Version 7 SOC.  
A growing number of attendees at the biennial WPATH Symposia (successors 
to the original 1960s and 1970s Symposia on Gender Identity) are transgender, with 
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many now organizing informally under the banner of TPATH (the Transgender 
Professional Association for Transgender Health). WPATH also benefits from the 
philanthropy of the first (known) transgender billionaire, Jennifer Pritzker, echoing 
Reed Erickson’s support for the early GICs in the U.S. However, many scholars and 
activists continue to criticize the diagnostic framework and assessment models that 
remain embedded within the DSM and SOC, arguing that these continue to 
pathologize transgender bodies, experiences, and desires (Davy, Sørlie, & Schwend, 
2018). Others – echoing the politics of those who participated in the Compton’s 
Cafeteria and Stonewall uprisings – prefer to focus on matters such as state violence, 
social inequalities, and economic insecurity, especially where these are compounded 
at the intersection of transphobia and racist violence (Raha, 2017).  
These debates played out powerfully at the 2018 WPATH Symposium in 
Buenos Aires. Following a ceremony in which Pritzker was given an award for 
philanthropy and praised the work of WPATH via video-link, the event saw a series 
of presentations from working groups drafting chapters for the forthcoming Version 8 
SOC. In many ways the draft SOC document reflects the success of the 
depathologization movement, as many chapters appear set to center “affirmative” 
approaches to transgender healthcare, which center patients’ decision-making and 
informed consent rather than gatekeeping (Cavanaugh, Hopwood & Lambert, 2016; 
Chang, Singh & dickey, 2018; Schulz, 2018). Nevertheless, debates continue over the 
role of healthcare professionals, especially those in the psy disciplines. More 
transgender people and international authors than ever before are involved in this 
process; however, authorship remains overwhelmingly cisgender and U.S.-based.  
Draft chapter presentations were followed by an extraordinary questions-and-
answers session, in which transgender professionals highlighted community mistrust 
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of WPATH, concerns regarding a lack of attention to intersex human rights, and 
language choice – such as a proposed chapter on “eunuchs,” to which some attendees 
vocally objected. Through these comments, WPATH and the SOC were critiqued for 
centering not only cisgender people’s perspectives, but also a white, Western 
perspective, a matter that was particularly pertinent given the event’s location. Human 
rights campaigner Mauro Cabral summarized these frustrations in a speech from the 
conference floor: “When WPATH decided to come to Argentina, with the most 
progressive gender identity law in the world, I was excited. But we could only talk 
among ourselves. You come to this country because of the weather, steak, and wine, 
but not to learn from us.” 
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we have traced a specific history of interactions between 
transgender people and the psy disciplines, highlighting the development of 
transnormativity and its implications in terms of clinical diagnostic guidelines and 
treatment. In so doing, this paper has argued that at certain key junctures, transgender 
people have made significant contributions to the framings of their lives. However, 
historically, these contributions have not always translated into less pathologizing 
accounts. Indeed, in many ways the histories mapped out in this paper suggest that 
transnormativity and pathologizing accounts have worked hand-in-hand. Importantly, 
while offering a predominantly historical account, we have suggested at key points in 
this paper that both transnormative and pathologizing accounts continue. For 
example, concepts such as “autogynephelia,” which suggest that transgender women 
are driven either by a suppressed “homosexual” attraction to men, or a fetishized 
desire to dress in “women’s clothing,” continue to be used not simply to pathologize, 
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but also to invalidate transgender women’s narratives (Bettcher, 2008). Indeed, 
Serano (2008) suggests that, as a form of pathologization, invalidation goes beyond 
the “simple” setting up of transgender women as a “problem,” and instead nullifies 
transgender women’s existence altogether. Psy disciplinary approaches that 
pathologize transgender people’s lives are also evident in ongoing attempts that claim 
to “cure” a person’s gender. While, as we noted, clinicians such as Harry Benjamin 
recognized that “reparative” psychotherapy or psychoanalysis had no role to play in 
the treatment of transgender people (e.g., Benjamin, 1967), “corrective” or “curative” 
approaches have continued to prevail in many geographical contexts (even if, at the 
same time, they have been outlawed in others).  
In North America, corrective or curative approaches have been primarily 
directed at children (Bryant 2006; 2008). Such approaches pathologize families 
through, for example, suggesting that particular parent-child dynamics “cause” gender 
non-conformity, which has led clinicians to direct parents to enforce behaviors and 
interests deemed “appropriate” to their assigned sex (see Pyne, 2014, for a summary 
of the work of both Rekers and Zucker). In response to such pathologizing accounts, 
there continue to be significant debates over whether or not gender non-conforming 
children and adolescents should be subject to diagnosis at all (Cabral, Suess, Ehrt, 
Seehole, & Wong, 2016; Drescher, 2014). In part, such debates emphasize that 
clinical diagnosis and treatment of gender non-conforming children may be aimed at 
preventing future queer adults, given the ongoing stigma attached to such adults in the 
context of a cisgenderist and heterosexist society (Bryant, 2006, 2008; Drescher, 
2010; Hegarty, 2018). While there has been a more recent shift towards affirming 
approaches to working with transgender children (see Riggs, 2019, for a summary), 
pathologizing approaches nonetheless continue to dominate much of the literature. 
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Ansara and Hegarty (2012) examined 94 journal articles published between 1999 and 
2008, finding that cisgenderism remained common throughout this time period in 
articles focused on children. This includes referring to children by their assigned sex 
rather than their gender, using pathologizing language, and recommending “curative” 
clinical responses.  
 In response to ongoing transnormative and pathologizing approaches, 
transgender people have sought to develop affirming approaches to clinical research 
and practice that challenge the broader psy disciplinary regulation of their lives. Key 
to affirming clinical approaches has been the recent development of the informed 
consent model of care, developed in partnership with transgender people (e.g., Cundill 
& Wiggins, 2017). Rather than centering clinician diagnosis and authorization for 
treatment, this model of care emphasizes that transgender people are more than 
capable of authorizing their own treatment in collaboration with clinicians (Schulz, 
2018). Such an approach challenges traditional models of care as outlined in the DSM 
and SOC, which in many instances continue to gatekeep access to care. Furthermore, 
an informed consent model recognizes that in many cases transgender people know 
more about their needs than many clinicians, given the dearth of training and 
specialization in the field of transgender health.  
Further, a rapidly growing body of research by transgender people has 
produced a clinical literature that increasingly challenges transnormativity and 
advocates for a more diverse understanding of transgender people’s lives and 
pathways through clinical care (e.g., Greatheart, 2013; Nealy, 2017). Most recently, 
this research has focused on how transgender people may be aware of 
transnormativity and actively work to resist it in the clinical sphere (Bradford & Syed, 
2019). However, because transgender clinicians do not exist outside of social norms 
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and structures, or the systems of power relations in which they are embedded, some 
may also endorse and utilize transnormative approaches in their own work.  
As such, and even as transgender people are increasingly involved in 
healthcare provision, it is important to be mindful of who is (and is not) present, and 
reflect critically on what perspectives they do (and do not) bring to the table. This 
paper has shown how transnormativity and processes of pathologization are 
ultimately also constructed through racialization practices, social-class privilege, 
competitions for professional prestige, and the binary Western norms of gender, sex, 
and sexuality. The vast majority of transgender people who have been involved in 
development of the HBIGDA/WPATH and the SOC, including key figures such as 
Patton, Denny, Lawrence, Green, and Whittle, are white, as have been the 
philanthropists Reed Erickson and Jennifer Pritzker. Of the growing number of 
transgender clinicians and researchers, a majority are white and/or transmasculine; 
this is particularly visible within organizing spaces such as TPATH meetings. 
Moreover, transgender people do remain a minority within professional settings and 
are absent from the authorship of transgender diagnostic classifications in the DSM. 
This is not a coincidence; rather, it reflects the wider inequalities in which transgender 
people’s struggles are embedded. Those who fail to recognize and account for this are 
liable to continue reproducing power inequalities and constructing constrained forms 
of subjectivity through their work (Rose, 1998).  
 In conclusion, this paper has suggested that while some things change, others 
stay resolutely the same. Transgender people are much more visible and are 
increasingly having input into how the psy disciplines understand and engage with 
their lives. However, the psy disciplines continue to regulate treatment for transgender 
people, reinforce transnormative approaches, and exclude the most marginalized and 
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vulnerable from services and professional bodies alike. As such, we must continue to 
critically examine historical and contemporary practices that enshrine the psy 
disciplines as the most appropriate arbiters of transgender people’s lives.  
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